A tradicionalidade da ocupação indígena e a constituição de 1988: a territorialização como instituto jurídico-constitucional
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Universidade do Estado do Amazonas
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This dissertation investigates the meaning of the expression traditionally occupied lands
coined in the Federal Constitution of 1988 and interpreted by the Supreme Court in which the
judgment of Petition no. 3388/RR in 2009, the case of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land,
founded on the theory of the indigenous fact (“fato indígena”), established the promulgation of
the National Constitution as a timeframe for the recognition of indigenous territorial r ights. For
this purpose, an initial inquiry on the history of the State's relationship with indigenous territorial
rights in Brazil was carried out, based on the analysis of how Iberian States during the colonial
period, and the Brazilian government established regulation of the relationship with Brazilian
indigenous peoples and their territories, through legal frameworks. Then the entire construction
process of the legal text of article 231, paragraph 1 of CRFB/88 from international debates on the
ILO Convention No. 169 is analyzed, up to the discussions held in the National Constituent
Assembly of 1987. I describe the survey of how the legal doctrine and jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court came to interpret the legal text mentioned here. Given these documentary data,
the research will examine the hypothesis that the Federal Constitution of 1988, in art. 231, §1º
and article 215, §1º, going beyond the indigenato and indigenous fact, have established
territorialization as a legal institution. To measure this hypothesis the research investigates the
following issues: 1) Is the expression traditionally occupied lands “vague” and does it permit the
application of the conception used by the Supreme Court? 2) Is it possible, through the theory of
constitutional change, to admit that article 231, §1 of the 1988 Federal Constitution has altered its
meaning to allow a time limitation for indigenous territorial rights? 3) Considering the
relationship between indigenous and quilombola territorial law, how has the latter been achieved
by case-law of the lower courts? 4) How do indigenous peoples interpret article 231, paragraph 1
of the 1988 Federal Constitution from the experiences of Northeast Indian demands and new
urban conflicts in the North? 5) How to think about a traditionalism that is distant from
archaeological and ethnocentric perspectives? 6) How to approach constitutionalizing attainment
of article 231, § 1 of the Federal Constitution?